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REFLECTIONS ON THE RHETORIC 





This essay begins with an acknowledgment that attempts to understand Brexit are, at this stage, condemned to partial 
understanding, at best, because as an event it is incomplete and moving in contradictory directions. Just a brief inventory 
of the many ways in which Brexit can be, and has been, approached gives one a sense of this centrifugalism – sovereignty; 
globalization; free trade; immigration; racism; disenfranchisement; nostalgia; affect; generational schism; post-imperial decline; 
neoliberalism; populism; poverty; austerity; class; multiculturalism; cosmopolitanism; far-right and Islamist extremism; Islam 
and Muslims; refugees; and so on and so on. One particular line of thought emerging among more scholarly treatments 
from within the arts and humanities (for example, as found in several essays in the volume Brexit and Literature) concerns 
itself with Brexit as an affective phenomenon, one that speaks to the structures of feeling that bind ‘Britishness’ into a 
cultural assemblage that goes beyond the artefactual sense of ‘culture’ to that nebulous and barely perceptible ‘way of life’ 
which constitutes the affective economy of most people living in the British Isles. This, however, is articulated – in the sense 
used by Stuart Hall – in very different ways depending on class, gender, region, educational background, nationality and, of 
course, race and ethnicity. This essay will probe the ways in which the affective economy of Brexit is mobilized by picking 
out one particular thread from within the tangled knot of multiple determinations that have brought the United Kingdom 
to where it now is: this thread follows the trope of (de)colonization across Brexit rhetorics and places it within a long durée 
that illuminates the extent to which the affective economy underlying Brexit is deeply embedded in a racialized sense of 
nationhood that reaches back to the beginnings of Britain’s colonial and thence post-colonial history. 
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Brexit has induced a political crisis within the 
United Kingdom that may lead to its political 
disintegration. It is possible, perhaps even probable, 
that Scotland will seek independence, especially if a 
‘hard’ Brexit materialises, and it is impossible to predict 
the consequences of such an outcome for Northern 
Ireland; indeed, it is possible that it may achieve the 
unification of Ireland in a way that would have been 
unthinkable until now. If these things happen, Brexit 
will have produced two of the greatest of historical 
ironies, the dissolution of a political unit brought about 
by its search for some kind of undiluted sovereignty 
and the re-unification of Ireland precipitated by 
people apparently committed to the Union of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. On another level, the 
electoral system is another likely casualty of the 
Brexit process. The series of crises and debacles 
that have accompanied the tortuous crawl towards 
departure have thrown the entire political system 
into disrepute, culminating in a political humiliation 
for both the main political parties in the somewhat 
pointless, but nevertheless highly significant, elections 
to the European Parliament in May 2019. This exploded 
the two-party political ecology of British democracy, 
and the first-past-the-post electoral system that is its 
corollary. Britain’s political environment is now a multi-
party system that, in the long-(perhaps even short- or 
medium-)term cannot be adequately serviced by its 
current electoral system. In terms of both its political 
architecture and its political infrastructure, then, Brexit 
has brought about a situation in which ‘the centre 
cannot hold’, to use Yeats’ resonant phraseology of 
political apocalypse (Yeats, 1991, p.187).
This essay is an attempt to interrogate and explore 
the value and significance of certain metaphors 
mobilized within Brexit discourse, so it is perhaps 
apposite to begin by pointing out that Brexit is a 
political explosion that is likely to have consequences 
in which the metaphor is materialised and made 
manifest in several ways. Brexit is an event, one that is 
still unfolding, is yet incomplete – despite the official 
departure of the UK from the EU on 31 January 
2020 – and is moving in multiple and contradictory 
directions. To try and account for it, to gather one’s 
thoughts about it is difficult – I won’t say impossible – 
precisely because, as a still unfolding event, it involves 
an explosive scattering in all sorts of directions all at 
once. Just a brief inventory of the many ways in which 
Brexit can be, and has been, approached gives one a 
sense of this centrifugalism –  sovereignty; globalization; 
free trade; immigration; racism; disenfranchisement; 
nostalgia; affect; generational schism; post-imperial 
decline; neoliberalism; populism; poverty; austerity; class; 
multiculturalism; cosmopolitanism; far-right and Islamist 
extremism; Islam and Muslims; refugees; and so on and 
so on. How can one account for all these and more 
ways in which Brexit has charged the social imaginary 
of twenty-first-century Britain, and galvanized forces 
that had lain dormant only to erupt in a furious mass 
of swirling, inchoate and perhaps uncontrollable social 
energy?
With this in mind, I am going to pick up one little 
thread in the rhetorical fabric of Brexit discourse 
and try to unravel some of its implications. This is the 
trope of (de)colonization that periodically surfaces, but 
which is more or less latent in Brexiteer discourse. 
It becomes visible mostly during moments of acute 
crisis – the critical weeks and months leading up to and 
immediately after the referendum itself, for example; or 
during the periods when the Brexit negotiations reach 
crunch point, such as after the brokering of what has 
become known as the Chequers agreement when Boris 
Johnson resigned from the Cabinet, arguing that the 
Chequers plan would reduce the UK ‘to the status of a 
colony’ (Stewart et al, 2018).
This was not the first time that the trope of 
colonization surfaced in Brexit discourses. Indeed, 
the legacy of British imperialism is a fundamental 
determinant of the Brexit imaginary (Mondal, 2018; 
Dorling & Tomlinson, 2019; O’Toole, 2019). In an 
earlier essay (2018), I suggested that the dominant 
narrative that was established immediately after the 
referendum, which had it that Brexit was principally 
driven by the frustrations, disempowerment and 
disenfranchisement of the ‘left behind’ remnants of a 
disaggregated, disintegrated urban working-class who 
formerly voted for the Labour Party, was in fact belied 
by close analysis of the voting patterns, which suggest 
that the majority of Brexit voters were relatively 
well-off, middle-class voters in the rural, suburban and 
small urban centres of the Tory shires.1 What these 
two groups (the ‘left behind’ and the well-off) had 
in common was, to my mind, an ‘imperially nostalgic 
nationalism’ that constituted an affect, a structure of 
1 This has been corroborated through more detailed 
analysis of much more extensive data by Danny Dorling and 
Susan Tomlinson (2019).
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feeling, in which a (perhaps, the) principal ingredient 
was a racial imaginary rooted in the hierarchies of 
British imperialism. The mobilization of this affective 
relation to the Empire could be seen in the importance 
of immigration as the premier logic determining voting 
intention at the referendum, and the continuities 
between the discourses on unrestricted migration 
from the EU with the discourses surrounding post-
war migration from former British colonies. The Brexit 
imaginary may have appeared, on the surface, to be 
referring principally to white migration from the EU – 
hence its apparent alibi against accusations of racism 
– but it was, in fact, a displacement of a colonial racial 
imaginary that is principally concerned with non-white 
racial others. As I also pointed out, within British racial 
imaginaries certain ‘white’ groups have in any case 
always been racialized by association with non-white 
racial others depending on political context, as the Irish 
and southern Europeans have long known, and now 
eastern Europeans have found out.
My reflections here on the trope of (de)
colonialization are therefore offered as embellishments 
and refinements of this previous argument, and I 
will begin by drawing attention to the brackets in 
the title, for they signal a notable doubleness in the 
trope that I want to investigate. The brackets signal 
the way in which the trope gestures, simultaneously, 
towards both colonization and decolonization as 
operative metaphors within the Brexit imaginary.2 
Johnson’s statement, for instance, speaks to the idea 
that a certain kind of Brexit, as represented by the 
Chequers plan or, more generally, by the term ‘soft 
Brexit’ will lead to Britain becoming a colony of the 
EU. But much of the force of Brexit as a mobilizing 
affect involves the imagining of Britain as already being 
a colony of the EU. Other terms have been used in 
Brexit discourse to reference this, such as vassalage 
or dependency, but the desire for ‘independence’ – 
articulated most clearly by Nigel Farage the morning 
after the referendum – clearly signals a cluster of 
emotional resonances concerning colonization (seen 
as a bad thing) and decolonization (seen as good). 
When Farage – a man not known for his reluctance 
to overstate his case – declared on 24 June 2016 that 
it would henceforth be known as ‘our independence 
day’ he was simultaneously drawing on the affective 
capital of the Fourth of July celebrations in the United 
2 Fintan O’Toole (2019) has also noted and comment-
ed on this in his magnificent book-length commentary on 
Brexit, although when this essay was first delivered as a key-
note lecture to the ‘Brexit Wounds’ conference in Manches-
ter in October 2018, O’Toole’s book had not yet become 
available.
States as a signifier of Liberty, and turning the tables 
on Britain’s characterization as a colonial overlord that 
suppressed the spirit of liberty. Britain was now no 
longer an oppressor, but one of the oppressed, longing 
to be free. According to this line of thinking, Brexit was 
the moment when, to borrow from Nehru a little, the 
‘soul of a nation, long suppressed’ found ‘utterance’.
One can witness this trope – and its double 
signification – playing out not only in public political 
discourse, but also in the more rarefied arena of 
academic historical enquiry. In a recent book, the 
maritime historian Andrew Lambert (2018) has argued 
that liberal values – and therefore, presumably, liberty 
and the rule of law – were propagated by ‘seapowers’ 
(of which early modern Britain was the exemplary 
example) in contrast to repressive, authoritarian 
‘landpowers’. Reviewing the book in the Times Higher 
Education, Sarah Kinkel suggests that,
[t]his may be because, like everyone else, 
[Lambert] has Brexit on his mind. Explaining 
history as a long struggle between progressive, 
liberal seapowers and repressive hierarchical 
land powers is a justification for the claim 
that the European Union is a new continental 
hegemon, on a trajectory to become ‘an empire, 
not a nation, closer to Russia and China than 
the liberal democratic nation states that are the 
legacy of seapower.’
(Kinkel, 2018)
What is remarkable about that final statement, and 
indeed the thesis of Lambert’s book as a whole, is the 
way in which it refers at once to the decolonization 
trope and yet also lays claim to the mantle and legacy 
of liberal imperialism that stands in the long historical 
lineage that connects Whig advocates of empire like 
Macaulay with the liberal humanitarian interventionism 
of Tony Blair. Moreover, there is something very 
intriguing about the structure of Lambert’s thesis 
which also exposes the doubleness of the trope of 
(de)colonization within Brexiteer discourse. As Kinkel 
notes (2018): ‘The implication is that Britain will 
rediscover the good parts of seapower once it’s freed 
from European shackles.’ Re-discover. The moment of 
liberation, of unshackling, of decolonization is posited 
– as it usually is by all Brexiteers – as a new beginning. 
But it is a new beginning that circles back to a previous 
beginning, the moment when Britain embarked upon 
its long journey toward maritime pre-eminence, a 
journey that took in, along the way, the colonization 
of much of Australasia, Asia, Africa and the Americas; a 
journey that concluded in its assumption of the mantle 
of Empire. If it seems somewhat ironic that Lambert 
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should both castigate the EU as an imperial formation 
and celebrate Britain’s liberation from empire by 
returning to the beginning of its own historical journey 
towards becoming an empire, then this is an irony that 
Brexiteers can, it seems, live very comfortably with.
There are two further points that can be teased 
out of this double-signification. The first is that it 
corroborates Robert Eaglestone’s point that Brexit is 
an affect that can be characterized as a ‘cruel nostalgia’ 
(Eaglestone, 2018). Drawing on the affect theory of 
Lauren Berlant, whose book Cruel Optimism (2011) 
analyses the affective power of the American Dream, 
and conceptualizes it as a ‘cruel optimism’, Eaglestone 
writes that ‘[o]ptimism becomes cruel when hoping 
or striving for what you desire is actually harming 
you…the object of desire remains a fantasy, and your 
commitment to that fantasy damages you: “get rich 
or die trying” [which is one of the key axioms of the 
American Dream] isn’t healthy’ (p.95). Eaglestone 
quotes Berlant as saying that ‘an optimistic attachment 
is cruel when the object/scene of desire is itself 
an obstacle to fulfilling the very wants that people 
bring to it: but its life organising status can trump 
interfering with the damage it provokes’ (p.95). Insofar 
as Brexit looks forward to a new beginning, it can be 
characterized as a cruel optimism – and the people 
of those regions of the UK most dependent on EU 
funding, those regions that most overwhelmingly voted 
Leave, may soon find out just how cruel their optimism 
was. But, says Eaglestone, Brexit is ‘nearly’ a very good 
example of cruel optimism. There is, however, one 
crucial difference: ‘Most affect theory deals with the 
present or (as in the case of cruel optimism) a focus 
on the future which ignores the detrimental effects 
in the present: but Brexit focusses on the past. Not 
cruel optimism, but cruel nostalgia’ (pp.95–6). But again, 
we find a doubleness that is not necessarily inscribed 
in nostalgia per se. Nostalgia, as such, does not have 
to look to the past in order to look forward; Brexit, 
however, does. It is, perhaps, both cruel optimism and 
cruel nostalgia.
The second point is that Lambert’s particular 
return to the beginning calls forth the trope of (de)
colonization in a way that rehabilitates a crucial 
historical distinction that is often now overlooked 
and, in the process, sheds some light on the affective 
force of ‘free trade’ as a term within the Brexit lexicon. 
Imagining Brexit as a new beginning that is also a re-
iteration of a prior beginning, as Britain begins to rule 
(once more) the waves, recalls an early association 
between trade, colonization and liberty, which was 
opposed at first to ‘imperialism’ and then, gradually 
and eventually, enveloped within the latter concept as 
the loss of Britain’s major colonies in America shifted 
attention to the east, where trading companies such 
as the East India Company were increasingly assuming 
the roles and responsibilities of government over 
the territories they had acquired as a result not of 
‘colonization’ but of trade and commerce.
It is worth excavating some of the history of 
this transition in order to illuminate some of the 
subterranean political imaginings that have been 
exhumed and re-animated by Brexit. The association 
of colonization (as opposed to decolonization) with 
liberty can be traced – in the English and American 
social imaginaries, at least – back to the establishment 
of the first American colonies, a mythic inscription of 
the desire for religious liberty on American soil being 
the motivation for the Mayflower settlers in Plymouth. 
But it is worth recalling that, historically speaking, the 
first English colonists in America were motivated by a 
desire for enrichment, inspired by the earlier Spanish 
expeditions and conquests and legends of gold and El 
Dorado. The failure of these early colonies prompted 
the establishment of colonial economies in which 
trade became a vital element of survival, and thence 
economic growth, development and expansion (Pagden, 
1998, pp.35–6). The key move, which was necessary for 
the establishment of the early colonies within the orbit 
of European commerce, was the development of an 
agricultural economy that in turn instituted a logic of 
territorial settlement in the colony, as inscribed in the 
common name for the ‘colony’ at the time: ‘plantation’. 
As Nicholas Canny has noted, the term ‘plantation’ 
has ‘gentler, horticultural associations’ and ‘the various 
English settlements in North America were known 
from the outset as “plantations”’ (2001, p.8).
This in turn meant that the problem of colonization 
in this early phase was the securing of rights over 
the lands on which the plantations were to be 
established. Enter John Locke and his Second treatise 
of Government (1988) which would enable the 
theorization of such territory as ‘unoccupied’ because 
a man could only secure rights of ownership over 
something if he ‘mixed his Labour with it’ (p.306); in 
other words, the land needed to be worked, and since 
the Native American tribes the settlers encountered 
were not agriculturalists who worked the land in 
ways that the Europeans could understand – since, 
that is, they lived in a ‘pre-commercial’ state (Pagden, 
1998, p.45) – they had no claim to it and it could be 
appropriated by the settlers (p.42). This, of course, 
was a prelude to the terra nullius concept that would 
facilitate settler colonialisms elsewhere, most notably 
in Australia and Southern Africa, but the key point 
here is that it obscures and overwrites any association 
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of colonization with conquest, and enables English 
colonists to imagine themselves as having ‘freely’ 
acquired their territorial possessions. The space of the 
colony remains a space of liberty.
We see here, then, in the very origins of English 
colonization of the Americas a nascent nexus of 
religious liberty, trade and territorial settlement that 
gave to the term colonization a positive meaning 
that was contrasted with a Spanish imperialism 
that was associated with cruelty and despotism. 
‘Since the English were eager to insist … upon the 
peaceful nature of their settlements, and to dissociate 
themselves from the image of conquest’, writes Pagden, 
‘[f]ew Englishmen believed that they … had deprived 
anyone of their inheritance’ unlike the Spanish who 
‘had invaded territories rightly occupied by legitimate, if 
primitive, rulers’ (the perceived civilizational difference 
between the urban Aztecs and Incas and the nomadic 
north American tribes was hugely significant here) 
(1998, p.51). Indeed, many believed they ‘were not the 
conquerors of Indians, but their saviours, not only from 
paganism and pre-agricultural modes of subsistence, but 
also Spanish tyranny’ (p.52). Nothing captures this early 
sense of colonization as a handmaiden to liberty better 
than Daniel Defoe’s novel Robinson Crusoe, in which a 
self-reliant, self-inventing and therefore ‘free’ individual 
(what better metaphor is there for the kind of liberty 
in which an individual is free from external constraints 
on their will – the kind later thought of as ‘negative’ 
liberty – than the desert island man?) is rewarded 
with vast riches and, more significantly, sovereignty in 
both a personal and political sense for his efforts in 
establishing a colonial outpost on unoccupied earth. 
As Ian Watt has pointed out, part of the enduring 
appeal of Defoe’s narrative is its ‘mythic’ character, one 
which clearly resonates today in the ersatz colonial 
nostalgia of Brexit in which Britain ‘goes-it-alone’; but 
it is also important to heed John Richetti’s warning 
that in Robinson Crusoe we do not find this myth 
fully established but rather in the process of being 
fashioned (Richetti, 2001). It is interesting, then, to find 
this passage in which Crusoe resolves not to kill the 
cannibals on the island by suggesting that such an act 
would be akin to the cruelty and barbarism of Spanish 
imperialism (thereby implicitly contrasting it with 
England’s more benevolent ‘colonialism’ in the reader’s 
mind):
This would justify the conduct of the Spaniards 
in all their barbarities practis’d in America…
where they destroy’d millions of these people…
the rooting them out of the country, is spoken 
of with the utmost abhorrence…by all other 
Christian nations of Europe, as a meer butchery, 
a bloody and unnatural piece of cruelty, 
unjustifiable to either God or man.
(Defoe, 2001, p.136)
This association of despotism with Catholic Spain’s 
imperialism was reinforced by Protestant England’s 
concurrent characterisation of the Ottoman Empire 
as similarly despotic (Pagden, 1998, p.52; Matar, 1999). 
In this early phase, then, the phase of mercantile 
colonialism – the phase that is so memorably 
articulated by Robinson Crusoe – imperialism was 
pejoratively opposed to colonization, and associated 
with authoritarianism, despotism, Catholicism and Islam: 
the imperial powers were Spain, Portugal, Hapsburg, 
Ottoman and Mughal. As traders, Britons had to deal 
with empires, but were not themselves representatives 
of an imperial mission.
The idea, as found in the early discourses of 
colonization, that colonization as an accompaniment to 
‘trade’ (and vice versa) is a form of liberty morphed, 
eventually, into the fully-fledged ideology of ‘free 
trade’ in the service of an imperialism that, in the 
British conceptualization of it, nevertheless remained 
associated with liberty, a process of ideological 
transfiguration that was so effective that, as Jennifer 
Pitts has shown, the scepticism of late eighteenth-
century Enlightenment thinkers such as Edmund Burke, 
Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham towards imperialism 
had, by the time of James and thence John Stuart Mill, 
been transformed into an imperial zeal that could 
not only accommodate the seeming contradiction 
between empire and liberty but appear to dissolve it 
altogether (2005).3 David Armitage (2000) has traced 
in detail the ways in which this transition happened 
through the course of the eighteenth century, and 
it was the figure of ‘trade’ that proved to be the 
crucial, alchemical category through which an empire 
of liberty could be rhetorically brought into some 
form of coherence. Drawn as they were to classical 
models and precedents through which they thought 
through political concepts and ideas, early modern and 
eighteenth-century English intellectuals were inevitably 
aware of Sallust’s account of imperial overreach as the 
reason for the collapse of the Roman Republic. The 
obvious conclusion was that imperialism and liberty 
were invariably at odds. At the same time, however, 
British overseas territorial possessions were becoming 
ever larger such that, according to Armitage, the phrase 
3 Duncan Bell (2016), although somewhat critical of 
the specifics of Pitts’ account, nevertheless concurs with the 
overall argument. See also Uday Singh Mehta (2018), which 
also offers a similar overall argument but with slightly differ-
ent emphases to both Pitts and Bell.
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‘imperialism’ becomes self-consciously associated with 
‘Britain’ for the first time in the mid-eighteenth century 
( 2000, p.8). Pride in this emergent empire wrestled 
with received wisdom of the threat to liberty posed by 
imperialism. This necessitated a redefinition of the term 
‘empire’ and it was achieved by drawing on the earlier 
positive associations gathered around ‘colonization’, 
particularly its association with ‘commerce’ and ‘trade’ 
for these would enable the expansion of the British 
‘empire’ without the military over-extensions that had 
so bedevilled the Roman exemplar and (given that by 
the late eighteenth century, the Spanish, Ottoman and 
Mughal empires were clearly in decline) more recent 
imperial polities. It is trade, then, that mediates and 
supervenes the opposition between empire and liberty; 
an empire based on trade offers a path to (imperial) 
glory that does not succumb to corruption, decadence 
and the loss of liberty (Armitage, 2000, p.142). A 
further important distinction was drawn between the 
nascent  British empire and these other examples: 
they had over-reached militarily because they had 
expanded through territorial conquest; that is, they 
were land-based; the British empire had grown out of 
its trading colonies, plantations and outposts, and these 
had all been enabled by Britain’s mastery of the sea. 
The British empire would be different from the others 
because, as Armitage pithily puts it: ‘Empire could 
only be compatible with liberty if it were redefined 
as maritime and commercial, rather than territorial 
and military’ (p.142). Since the British empire would 
be an ‘empire of the sea’, ‘not only would empire be 
at last reconciled with liberty, but liberty would be its 
essential foundation’ (pp.142–3). It is worth quoting 
Armitage’s final assessment in full here because it 
shows just how much the entire structure of an early 
imperial imaginary, as Britannia initially sallied forth 
to ‘rule the waves’, is rehabilitated and reproduced in 
contemporary Brexit discourse by right-wing historians 
such as Lambert as much as by Brexit-supporting 
politicians and journalists:
The vision of a maritime trading empire, and 
the diagnosis of England’s fitness to capture it, 
identified the success of a trading nation with the 
liberty of its government, distinguished territorial 
conquest from the unlimited potential of empire 
upon the sea, and thus laid the foundations for 
a blue-water policy designed to enrich England 
while defeating universal monarchy in Europe. 
A typology thereby emerged which would hold 
sway for at least half a century. The Bourbon 
monarchies were ambitious for universal 
monarchy, their designs lay on the continent of 
Europe, their monarchies were absolute, and 
hence they could not flourish as commercial 
powers. England (and, after 1707, Great Britain) 
was a free government, which encouraged rather 
than depressed trade, and its destiny lay in the 
empire of the sea rather than in territorial 
conquest, which was a danger to liberty itself, 
as well as a diversion from the nation’s true 
commercial interests.
(p.144)
By the time of the Opium Wars, a liberal imperialism 
fully reconciled with, and committed to the extension 
of liberty across the globe had become firmly rooted 
in the British (and especially English) social and political 
imaginary (Pitts, 2005; Bell, 2016). Amitav Ghosh, in 
the second and third instalments of his magisterial Ibis 
Trilogy, accounts for the formation of the colonies of 
Singapore and Hong Kong as part of a process whereby 
these south-east and east Asian footholds can serve 
both as conduits for the trade between Imperial China 
and British India, and launchpads for military offensives, 
all in the service of liberty (Ghosh, 2011, 2015). This 
trilogy of novels is particularly acute in showing how 
colonization was, materially speaking, a fundamental 
and necessary vehicle for the operation of ‘free trade’ 
and, conversely, how ‘free trade’ was integral to the 
ideological justification of colonialism. The emphasis on 
‘Free Trade’ in the Brexiteer lexicon cannot but carry 
this historical freight.
But part of the polysemy, the doubleness, of the 
trope of (de)colonization is the way in which it also 
indexes the decolonization and dismantling of Britain’s 
imperial infrastructure as a rupture in this narrative, 
and Brexit discourses surreptitiously imbricate this 
other sense of (de)colonization in a euphemistic, 
some might say dog-whistle, register that alludes to 
the perceived consequences of decolonization (in 
this disruptive sense) on Britain’s self-perception, 
self-identity and ‘way of life’. The ‘pastoral’ nostalgia 
(yet another!) that Ankhi Mukherjee (2018) finds 
lurking within the affective economy of Brexit, in a 
reading of Roger Scruton’s imagining of it, has been 
ably documented in relation to class and the ways 
in which a conservative tradition has imagined the 
consequences of industrialization, urbanization and the 
emergence of radical working-class politics within the 
urban proletariat. But, as Edward Said has shown, even 
as sensitive and rich a documentation of this persistent 
sense of loss as Raymond Williams’ The Country and the 
City (1973), has been blind to the ways in which race 
and post-war immigration presses upon the structures 
of feeling that constitute post-imperial Britain (Said, 
1994, p.14, p.77). The task, then, is to connect these 
two narratives of loss: of the pastoral Arcadia, and of 
imperial pre-eminence. Brexit is one such point of 
connection.
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As I have noted elsewhere (Mondal, 2018), this 
period of decolonization coincided with the period in 
which Britain’s imperial decline is accompanied by its 
gradual incorporation into the European project and 
eventual accession into the EU, and it might perhaps 
be speculated that this coincidence is precisely what 
determines the Brexiteers’ retrospective re-telling 
of this period in terms of Britain’s ‘colonization’ by 
Europe, which is itself sutured to the sense that 
decolonization’s consequences have led to the ‘reverse 
colonization’ of Britain itself by those it once colonized.
Louise Bennett, the Caribbean poet, coined this 
phrase with her tongue rather firmly in her cheek 
in order to satirize the racist essentialism that 
accompanied popular British attitudes towards post-
Windrush non-white immigration (Bennett, 1982), 
but certain strands within post-imperial British life 
and thought have taken it at face value, as a fact 
that offers a premise for an argument: both Powell’s 
‘rivers of blood’ speech and Thatcher’s reference to 
‘swamping’ during the 1979 general election campaign 
articulate this anxiety over a perceived ‘reverse 
colonization’, anticipating of course the Brexiteer 
discourse deployed during the referendum implicating 
the EU in the overwhelming of Britain by Others, 
both European and non-European, and prefiguring 
the later characterization of the EU as the agent of 
Britain’s abject colonization (which is always-also-
and-already the ‘reverse colonization’ to which the 
discourse of British post-imperial nationalism initially 
referred).4 Hence, the narrative of colonization by the 
EU, which, in its doubleness, is also the narrative of 
‘about to become colonized’ by the EU, is invariably 
– if euphemistically – racialized even if, on the surface, 
concern with EU migration appears not to be.
There is, I think, a connotational link between the 
language of ‘swamping’ directed towards non-white 
immigration, and the idea of ‘encroachment’ by the EU 
on Britain’s sovereignty, mediated by a pastoral ‘idea 
of England … threatened with extinction’ (Mukherjee, 
2018, p.80). With regard to race the mediation works in 
two ways; on the one hand, it associates the disruptive 
black presence in England (principally) with the infernal 
space of post-industrial urban centres, with an added 
rhetorical layer of associations drawn, as Paul Gilroy 
showed in There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack (2002), 
from the archive of racialized colonial tropes. On the 
other, it secures the whiteness of this pastoral space 
by registering the disruptiveness of any black presence 
4 There is also a connotational adjacency to the use 
of the term ‘reverse racism’ (and, latterly, the linkage of this 
term to the notion of ‘political correctness’) by the New 
Right from the late 1970s onwards, as it critiqued and hol-
lowed out the discourses of anti-racist movements that had 
mobilized in the name of non-white migrant communities to 
Britain from the former colonies (see Barker, 1981).
outside those urban centres (Loh, 2013). Within the 
affective economy of this pastoral vision, the authentic 
Arcadia that has been successively corrupted by capital, 
immigration and the EU is signalled as a ‘white’ space, 
a subterranean bedrock that has been overwritten 
by layer upon layer of coloured ink, first formerly 
commonwealth black, thence EU blue.
Which brings me to the rise of racist populism as 
the principal register of Brexit discourse. It is a truism, 
now, that the cold rationalism of Remain arguments 
about economic damage did not stand a chance against 
the affective mobilizations of the Leave campaigns, even 
though this alignment of Remain with reason, and affect 
with Leave does not really hold (Meek, 2019); much 
of the Remain strategy depended on the generation 
of fear of the economic consequences of Brexit, such 
that it was characterized, with egregious hypocrisy 
on the part of the Leave-supporting media, as Project 
Fear. Moreover, there was cold-blooded calculation on 
the part of Leave, not least in the sophisticated use 
of social media algorithms to generate a snowball of 
emotive messages leveraging fear of otherness in order 
to mobilize the vote. Nevertheless, the Leave campaign 
was a paradigmatic example of affective politics, in 
which “politicians…do not have clear, complex policies 
but rather seek to embody moods” (Eaglestone, 2018, 
p.95). As with Brexit, so with Trump, and even if it is 
not true that democratic politics is now all about affect 
whereas before it was reasonable and rational (how 
much more affective a politics can you get than the 
Conservative election poster in 1964 warning ‘If you 
want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Labour’?), then it 
is certainly the case that today’s digital instruments of 
affective politics have magnified and multiplied messages 
that neither require nor seek argumentation but 
rather cathect and charge inchoate social energies into 
subliminal, barely perceptible and sometimes explicit 
messages of fear and loathing.
But even so, there is, in theory, no necessary 
reason why the principal register of Brexit should 
have become a populist racism. Indeed, there are some 
prominent Brexiteers (who have now largely departed 
the stage or have struggled to attract the limelight) 
who have been frankly appalled by this register and its 
mobilization on behalf of Brexit (one thinks of Douglas 
Carswell and Daniel Hannan, principally).5 It has been 
the core of my argument so far, such as it is, to provide 
plausible reasons as to why this has become the case 
– and, indeed, it is notable that both Carswell and 
5 Dorling and Tomlinson (2019) have noted that 
several of the leaders and campaigners of both Leave cam-
paigns were born and raised in distant outposts and former 
colonies of the erstwhile British empire. Many of them were 
not quite so appalled by the racism of the campaign, indeed 
some, like Arron Banks, were instrumental in racializing the 
referendum.
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Hannan were both born and initially raised in two of 
Britain’s former colonies, Hong Kong and Kenya, such 
that it is probably the case that they are psychologically 
animated by the project of rehabilitating the kind of 
colonial nostalgia that I have identified above, one built 
on the resonances of an early association of free trade 
and liberty.
But, of course, this racist populism is not unique to 
Britain. It is even more prominent on the continent, 
within the very EU from which Britain is departing. It 
would thus appear to be the case that racist populism 
is fast becoming the only common ground between the 
political cultures of the EU and Britain. And this should 
not surprise anyone, because colonization, racism and 
the consequences of decolonization are not part of 
the story of Britain only, but of Europe as a whole. 
As Marlow puts it in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, ‘all 
Europe went into the making of Kurtz’ (Conrad, 1983, 
p.86), that archetypal figure of the colonial imaginary 
that is the diabolical double of the ‘good’ colonial 
figures that populate, for example, Kipling’s short 
stories.
And the narrative of decolonization is a narrative 
that encompasses all of Europe too, not least because 
the racial imaginaries of European countries have also 
had to reckon with and acknowledge the tumultuous 
consequences of decolonization, both in terms of the 
position of European economies in a world economic 
system that has shifted, not radically but certainly 
perceptibly and significantly, away from Europe (and 
even, now, the United States) towards Asia; and in 
terms of the arrival, within their own boundaries, of 
peoples from territories they either governed during 
their own imperial periods, or, latterly in the form 
of refugees, from the poisonous legacies bequeathed 
to entire regions by colonial governments as they 
carved out enormous swathes of territory for mutual 
European benefit and rivalry. Put simply, decolonization 
inaugurated a structural readjustment in the global 
economy and in geo-politics that is playing itself out, at 
one level, through the epiphenomena of Brexit and the 
emergence of racist populism.
To elaborate on this a little, if we move from 
the European to the global scale, then both the EU 
itself and Brexit are responses to the problematic of 
decolonization, the provincialization of Europe and the 
‘West’ – that historic if nevertheless unfinished and 
glacially slow re-orientation of the world economy and 
readjustment of global hierarchies of power.6 Europe 
has, through the consolidation of its economies into an 
EU, managed to hold off the economic consequences 
of this readjustment for a period, but it has increasingly 
struggled to do so; meanwhile, to paraphrase Churchill 
– which, given his commitment to racist imperialism 
6 The phrase is, of course, taken from Dipesh Chakra-
barty’s highly significant book, Provincializing Europe (2009).
as well as greater European co-operation, seems 
both appropriate and somewhat ironic – the skies of 
Europe are indeed darkening with pigeons coming 
home to roost: the refugee crisis is merely the most 
extreme and visible symptom of the EU’s increasingly 
feeble attempts to contain the consequences of the 
problematic of (de)colonization.
Fleeing the consequences of structural 
underdevelopment, and the redrawing of political 
territorialities on behalf of the administrative 
convenience of colonizing powers, the ensuing 
economic and political disturbances of erstwhile 
colonies have led to unprecedented migrant flows, 
both forced and unforced: the other side of the refugee 
crisis is the hollowing out of many societies in the 
global South by the need for skilled as well as unskilled 
migration from former colonies in order to stem the 
inevitable decline in productivity within Europe arising 
from an ageing population; this is the economic ‘pull’ 
that is the accompaniment to the ‘push’ of war, famine, 
disease, unemployment and poverty. Inevitably, the 
arrival of these dark-skinned others has disrupted the 
psychogeography of race as established by colonial 
and imperial racism, and its constitutive role in the 
formation of European nation-states (Lentin, 2004; 
Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991), which simultaneously 
draws attention to and calls into question the twin 
privileges of European universalism and whiteness.
The Europe-wide response, of course, has been 
articulated through a racialized register that, for a 
brief interlude, was muted but never absent, and has 
now broken out into the open on the continent and 
in these islands. Brexit is therefore merely a British-
inflected variant of this pan-European or Western 
reflex to reassert white privilege through the 
discursive hierarchies of racism. These are the morbid 
symptoms that Gramsci identified as the inevitable 
accompaniment to periods of interregnum, when the 
old order is dying but a new one is yet to be born. 
Where this will lead is anyone’s guess, but the signs are 
not good.
On the other hand, if decolonization offers a 
frame within which to make sense of these large 
scale changes in economy, society and politics, as well 
as providing at least a significant key to unlocking 
the mystery of the affective structure mobilizing 
Brexit, then it can also perhaps be used as a frame 
within which to re-consider the idea that Brexit is an 
unprecedented event. It is certainly unprecedented in 
the history of the European Union, but that is a very 
small and very recent frame. Shift the frame, enlarge 
it somewhat spatially and elongate it temporally, and 
one can see that decolonizing nations were themselves 
seceding from a customs union and free trade area, a 
kind of Brexit avant la lettre, also animated by affects 
structured by nationalism, claims for sovereignty and 
49
OPEN ARTS JOURNAL, ISSUE 8, SUMMER 2020 www.openartsjournal.orgISSN 2050-3679
a desire for independence. The fates of many post-
colonial nations, politically speaking, do not augur well 
for the consequences of Brexit. For one thing, what the 
painful history of decolonization tells us is that when 
the high hopes of independence are thwarted, as they 
invariably are, the result is a kind of bitter resentment 
and an increase in chauvinism and xenophobia, nativism 
and sectarianism, a rise in political and religious 
fanaticism.7
The rise of modern Islamism, for example, is 
a fiendishly complex story that is prone to gross 
oversimplification, but it is surely no coincidence that 
modern Islamism emerges, plurally, with the formation 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 partly 
as a result of the inevitable disillusionment that 
accompanied the illusory ‘independence’ granted to 
Egypt in 1922; from the withering of the promise of 
Pakistan as a Muslim nation-state; and also the CIA-
induced overthrow of the democratically elected 
Mossadeq-led socialist government in Iran, and the 
subsequent consolidation of the Shah’s reactionary 
and brutally authoritarian regime by the US and its 
allies. Likewise, the emergence of Hindutva as a major 
political force in postcolonial India, or of the highly 
chauvinistic Sinhalese nationalism in Sri Lanka, or of 
Duterte’s authoritarian populism in the Philippines, 
cannot be distilled into a singular causal explanation, 
but in each case a potent factor is the succumbing 
of mythic plenitude, of wholeness, contained in 
the promise of ‘independence’ to the realities of 
dependency and interdependency, with their attendant 
compromises, adjustments and defeats. Unlike the real 
colonization and brutal exploitation of these former 
colonial territories (with the exception, of course, 
of Iran, which was never formally colonized), the 
reduction of Britain to the status of a colony may be, 
as I have argued, merely a phantasmagorical figure in 
the rhetorical assemblage of the Brexit imaginary, but 
so too are the sunny uplands promised by a soon-
to-be-independent Britain setting forth to rule, once 
more, the waves.8 Brexit nationalism shares with many 
of these thwarted anti-colonial nationalisms not only 
an entangled history, but also a desire for something 
that will not, indeed perhaps cannot, come to pass. 
What will happen then? It may behove many in Britain 
to stop navel-gazing and take a look around at what 
7 This would be presumably inserted into the 
recurring series of disappointments, thwarted dreams and 
fantasies and ‘betrayals’ that Fintan O’Toole has so acutely 
dissected in his discussion of Brexit in Heroic Failure (2019).
8 Note also the egregious recent comparison of 
Brexit Britons to African slaves rising up against their mas-
ters made by Ann Widdecombe, the erstwhile Tory MP and 
minister who now sits in the European Parliament as a Brexit 
Party MEP (see Scott, 2019). The word ‘chutzpah’ does not 
begin to cover it.
has happened elsewhere in the last half-century: it is 
not a story that is alien to them. Indeed, to paraphrase 
one of the characters in Salman Rushdie’s novel The 
Satanic Verses (1992), the trouble with the British is that 
most of their history happened overseas – but they 
have willfully forgotten or, indeed, never even noticed it 
(Dorling & Tomlinson, 2019).
By way of conclusion, let me say explicitly that by 
offering these thoughts on Brexit and (de)colonization 
I do not mean to imply that Brexit can be reduced to 
this, as if it were a singular causal explanation. History 
simply does not work like that. I am aware that, as 
Robert Eaglestone and Fintan O’Toole (among many 
others) have noted, the Second World War plays 
perhaps as big if not bigger part in the Brexit imaginary 
as does Empire – but the empire, as Santanu Das and 
Michael Ondaatje have reminded us, was as deeply 
implicated in that war, and the one that preceded it, 
as Europe (Ondaatje, 1993; Das 2011, 2017, 2018). I 
am aware, too, that class is ever-present, but this does 
not mean that class trumps race, or that the logic of 
capital in the era of post-colonial globalization is more 
important than the logic of capital in the period of 
colonization: all these stories intersect, run into one 
another, form the series of local to global scales that 
bear down on this thing called Brexit and all that it 
means and can possibly mean. As I said at the beginning, 
Brexit involves a scattering, a kind of centrifugal force 
that runs in several directions all at once. It therefore 
presents a challenge to thought of a quite unusual, if 
not quite unprecedented, kind. It is not a challenge that 
can be met by the peculiar pleasures of parochialism.
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